

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700509



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 9 May 1970*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**


*For the President Only*

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## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1970

Weekly average for each month




FEBRUARY - MAY 1970


Weekly data as reported




increased markedly to 160 from last week's 123.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




rose sharply to 481 contrasted to last week's 300. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




remained at zero for the third week. The total number of infiltrators detected since 23 October 1969 stands at some 59,000 to 60,500.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




reflected the enemy's continuing, limited current offensive as they increased again to 987 from last week's 918.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



climbed to 5,898, significantly higher than last week's 3,415.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces rose again to 66% over last week's 62%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

This week, higher levels of enemy activity in the northern provinces of South Vietnam highlighted the current phase of stepped-up Communist activity. The enemy will probably attempt to continue his offensive for at least another week or so by mounting attacks in widely scattered areas, though the individual attacks themselves will probably not be on a large scale. Harassment by fire, including sporadic rocket attacks against major cities, will probably also continue.

In north Laos, the situation remains quiet with government guerrillas encountering little resistance as they move out of their enclaves. To the south, however, the Communists have continued attacking government positions near the Bolovens Plateau. A Lao government decision to evacuate non-combatants from Saravane probably presages the loss of this province capital as further Communist attacks in the area are anticipated.

Allied operations into Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia are generally encountering only light resistance. In about one week, these operations in Cambodia have resulted in the seizure of more enemy supplies and materiel than has been captured in South Vietnam during the entire past year. Deeper inside Cambodia, however, the Communists have increased their harassment of government positions and lines of communication across a wide front.


Enemy Infiltration

The apparent standdown of troop infiltration into South Vietnam carried into its fifth week with only a few small "QL" groups, probably composed of specialists, detected since 8 April. The current lack of detections suggests that the pattern of last year's rainy season is being repeated. Less than 4,000 infiltrators were observed entering the pipeline from May through September 1969.

South Vietnam Developments

The disturbances in Saigon have subsided temporarily following the government's crackdown against the dissidents last week but the basic causes of the malaise remain, and the situation is still potentially inflammable. Our Station in Saigon summarizes the situation in the following way: Opposition to the Thieu government has grown over the last six months, spurred by an unfavorable economic situation and given added impetus by a long series of other troublesome issues. Disturbances in Saigon during the last two weeks contributed to an atmosphere of disquiet and raised apprehensions among Vietnamese that a more serious disruption of public order may be in the offing. Agitation has thus far been centered largely in Saigon, but should it spread to other areas of the country, the equilibrium of Thieu's administration could be threatened. The discontent has culminated in the protest of the students, who, with the help of some outside instigation, have persisted in their anti-government agitation despite repeated government attempts to conciliate them. The recent Buddhist confrontation between the rival An Quang and Quoc Tu factions has added a further destabilizing element and threatens to embroil the government in a religious controversy not of its making. In addition, the Supreme Court's three recent rulings against the government have served to give further ammunition to the opposition and damage the government's image. However, the opposition is still fragmented and continued U.S. support should deter anyone of a mind to move against the Thieu government. The more forceful action taken recently against demonstrators may also act as a deterrent against further disorders. In addition, government moves into Cambodia have served to raise the morale of the military, which had been showing increasing signs of discontent over economic difficulties. Recognizing that the government's position is still not strong and that any further disturbances or a worsening of the economic situation would have an additional weakening effect, we still believe, on balance, that the Thieu government will weather the current storm, but the prospects for the long term are not so clear.

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